The concept of introspection in the light of cognitive sciences

The thesis is a study of the explanatory value of the notion of introspection in contemporary analytical philosophy of mind. In the first part, I analyze the ways in which the term “introspection” is used both in scientific and common language. In the second part, I present a classification of various models of gaining self-knowledge. I discuss the main contemporary proposals critically. I argue that some nonintrospectionist accounts can be fruitfully used to explain different types of self-knowledge. In particular, I defend a constitutivist account of self-knowledge of beliefs. I sketch an original account of self-knowledge of emotions that combines elements of expressivism, constitutivism as well as detectivism. I argue that the discussion about the theoretical usefulness of the notion of introspection should be reduced to the question about the irreducible detectivist aspects of self-knowledge. It is such a “moderate” introspectionist hypothesis that should be the object of the debate in contemporary philosophy of mind.