Abstract:
Experimental philosophy (often referred to as 'x-phi') is a new current in modern analytic philosophy
that has gained much popularity in recent years. The followers of this approach point at the fact that philosophers
often make empirically testable predictions about non-philosophers’ reactions to certain philosophical thought
experiments. In order to test these claims, experimental philosophers adopt survey and experimental methods
commonly used in social sciences and attempt at collecting information on non-philosophers’ intuitions
concerning different philosophical problems. The main aim of this dissertation is to provide a detailed, critical
analysis of the novel methodological proposal promoted by experimental philosophers.
Chapter I is a short introduction to experimental philosophy. In this chapter, I identify and characterize
the methodological solution specific to x-phi studies – the scenario method. I explain the links between
experimental philosophy and some classic approaches in philosophy, such as conceptual analysis and the method
of thought experiments. I also discuss the diversity of research aims within experimental philosophy and present
a classification of branches of experimental philosophy that can be drawn basing on such differences.
Chapter II is devoted to the first major objection raised by the opponents of experimental philosophy –
the expertise argument. According to this line of reasoning, data collected in x-phi studies are philosophically
irrelevant, since nearly all experiments focus on non-philosophers’ intuitions. The proponents of the expertise
arguments claim that when one considers philosophical problems, one should rather refer to intuitions shared by
experts on the matter – professional philosophers. However, basing on the results of some recent studies, I argue
that these expectations towards philosophers are likely to be incorrect.
In Chapter III, I present and analyze another objection against experimental philosophy – the argument
from quality of intuitions, according to which methods used by experimental philosophers do not guarantee
revealing intuitions of the desired kind and because of that, the collected data may not be philosophically
significant. I analyze different variants of this argumentative strategy and consider different methodological
solutions adopted in experimental philosophy that might be sources of such problems. Finally, I argue that the
objection suggesting that the results of x-phi studies are often affected not only by semantic factors, but also by
pragmatic factors, is the strongest potential threat for the methodological proposal promoted by experimental
philosophers. The claim that the data collected in x-phi studies are usually shaped by pragmatic phenomena, and
it is difficult to experimentally isolate the influence of pragmatic and semantic factors on non-philosophers’
judgments, is the main thesis defended in this dissertation.
In Chapters IV and V, I present empirical data collected in my own experiments which support the
abovementioned thesis. Chapter IV regards the results of x-phi studies concerning contextualism. Previous
studies suggest that the outcomes are more favorable to contextualism in the case of within-subject experimental
design than in the case of between-subject experimental design. Basing on the results of my studies and provided
interpretation of the abovementioned difference in terms of pragmatic phenomena, I argue against using withinsubject
design in experiments concerning contextualism. Chapter V focuses on x-phi studies regarding reference
of proper names. I suggest that the method of measuring folk intuitions on this issue adopted in previous studies
– narrow forced choice – may be a source of serious problems. Referring to the results of my experiments, I
argue that data collected in previous studies on this topic may not be only shaped by participants’ semantic
considerations (as intended by the researchers) but also by their reactions to some superficial characteristics of
the stimuli driven by pragmatic mechanisms.
Apart from arguing in support of the main thesis, the dissertation provides many analyses of different
methodological solutions used in experimental philosophy, identifying its strengths and weaknesses, and suggests some solutions that might help making experimental philosophy a more successful scientific endeavor.